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IN JUSTICE BERYL LEVINE'S VIEW:




When I was asked by the 1995-96 Articles Editor of the North
Dakota Law Review to write an article for the Law Review edition honor-
ing Justice Beryl J. Levine, I asked Justice Levine to send me a list of
what she considered to be her ten most important decisions. She sent me
a list which included some titles to cases and some cases described .by
content. From that list, my co-author identified one dozen cases.
We have elected to analyze these cases by breaking them down into
categories without attempting to rank them by their importance to North
Dakota jurisprudence. They are not limited to, but they are particularly
indicative of, Justice Levine's serious advocacy of individual rights in the
field of criminal law and her strong belief in the primary caretaker's
rights in the field of domestic relations. Through her majority, specially
concurring, and dissenting opinions in different areas of the law, she has
definitely made her mark as the first woman Justice of the North Dakota
Supreme Court.
Others will no doubt write in detail of her many achievements while
a member of the court, but this article will be limited to an analysis of the
cases she herself deemed most crucial. She described them in her note
to us as her "favorite opinions."
II. THE OPINIONS
A. CRIMINAL JURISPRUDENCE: STATE V. ORR
In State v. Orr,' Justice Levine, writing for the court, concluded that
the North Dakota Constitution protected an offender convicted of
driving under the influence from sentence enhancement based on a prior
uncounseled guilty plea.2
* Former Chief Justice, North Dakota Supreme Court; J.D., University of Minnesota. Served as
Chief Justice of the North Dakota Supreme Court during eight of Justice Beryl J. Levine's eleven
years on the court.
** Smith, Bakke, Hovland & Oppegard, P.C., Bismarck, N.D.; J.D., 1995, University of North
Dakota. Served as Justice Levine's law clerk for the majority of her last year on the court.
1. 375 N.W.2d 171 (N.D. 1985).
2. State v. Orr, 375 N.W.2d 171, 178 (N.D. 1985).
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Kenneth Orr was convicted of DUI after a bench trial. 3 Because it
was his second DUI conviction, the court sentenced him to four days in
jail plus a fine, in conformity with statutory requirements for sentencing
DUI offenders.4 Orr argued that it was unconstitutional for the court to
use his prior DUI conviction as a basis for enhancing his sentence
because "there was no proof that he was advised of, and waived, his right
to counsel before pleading guilty to the earlier DUI charge." 5
Justice Levine first addressed the issue of whether the trial court
indeed sentenced Orr as a second-time DUI offender.6 'Justice Levine
wrote that, while "the trial court failed to articulate its reasons for
imposing the particular sentence" the record showed that the trial court
sentenced Orr "to incarceration solely because he was a second
offender."7 Justice Levine then considered whether the trial court erred
in concluding that Orr had waived his right to counsel before his prior
conviction. 8 Because there was nothing in the record of Orr's prior
conviction indicating affirmatively that Orr waived his right to counsel,
she concluded the trial court erred in deciding that Orr had validly
waived his right.9
Therefore, the court was left with the issue of whether Orr could be
sentenced as a second-time DUI offender based on a prior uncounseled
DUI conviction.10 Orr argued that the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Baldasar v. Illinois II barred use of his prior conviction to
enhance his present sentence. 12 After a thorough analysis of Baldasar,
however, Justice Levine concluded that it did not apply to Orr's case
because his prior uncounseled conviction was not for a crime punishable
by more than six months imprisonment.13
The State, on the other hand, argued that the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Lewis v. United States14 supported its argument as to
the validity of using Orr's prior uncounseled conviction to enhance his
present sentence. 15 Justice Levine, however, indicated that Lewis was
inapplicable because the North Dakota statute requiring sentence
enhancement when an offender accumulates multiple DUI convictions,
in contrast to the federal statute at issue in Lewis, "necessarily focuses on




7. Id. at 173-74.
8. Id. at 174.
9. Id. at 174-75.
10. Id. at 175.
11. 446 U.S. 222 (1980).
12. Orr, 375 N.W.2d at 175.
13. Id. at 176.
14. 445 U.S. 55 (1980).
15. Orr, 375 N.W.2d at 176.
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the reliability of the first conviction, and not on the mere fact of its
occurrence." 16 She concluded that Lewis, therefore, was not a control-
ling precedent.17
Justice Levine next turned to Orr's argument that his sentence was
imposed in violation of Article I, Section 12, of the North Dakota
Constitution, which grants persons accused of crimes "the right 'to
appear and defend in person and with counsel."1 8 She observed that
this right is one that "has long been zealously guarded not only by the
courts of this State . . . but also by the Legislature as far back as
1895."' 19 Therefore, she explained, it was a right that, in North Dakota,
"has been exercised independently of any compulsion under federal law
or the federal constitution:" 20 Justice Levine further indicated that state
and federal caselaw on uncounseled convictions showed that such
convictions "are to be rightly regarded with skepticism. They are
unreliable."21
Given the questionable reliability of uncounseled convictions and
the special importance of the right to counsel in North Dakota, Justice
Levine concluded that "absent a valid waiver of the right to counsel the
resulting conviction cannot .. be used to enhance a term of imprison-
ment for a subsequent offense." 22 Therefore, Justice Levine advised, all
courts "must obtain a valid waiver of counsel on the record 'or afford a
nonindigent defendant the opportunity to retain counsel, or appoint
counsel for an indigent DUI defendant regardless of the penalty to be
imposed, if enhancement of punishment for a subsequent conviction is
not to be precluded." 23
The "final issue" presented in Orr was the question of whose bur-
den it would be to prove the validity of a prior uncounseled conviction
"when the record is silent on waiver."24 Justice Levine answered this
question quickly, relying on Burgett v. Texas,25 in which the Supreme
Court "held that a prior felony conviction was presumed void and could
not be used to enhance punishment, where the record did not indicate
that the defendant had, or waived, counsel." 26 Justice Levine asserted
that the Court's reasoning in Burgett applied to Off's case, and indicated
that "the silent record is insufficient to overcome the presumption that
16. Id. at 177.
17. Id.
18. Id. (citing N.D CONST., art. I, § 12).
19. Id. (citations omitted).
20. Id. at 178.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 178-79.
23. ld. at 179.
24. Id.
25. 389 U.S. 109 (1967).
26. Orr, 375 N.W.2d at 179.
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the prior uncounseled conviction was void for enhancement pur-
poses." 27 Because the State did not introduce other evidence tending to
show the validity of Orr's prior uncounseled conviction, Justice Levine
concluded that the State failed to overcome the presumption that Orr's
prior conviction was void for enhancement purposes.2 8 The court
therefore reversed Orr's sentence. 29
Justice Levine was joined in the Orr majority by Justice Herbert L.
Meschke and Justice Herman "Sparky" Gierke. 30 Then-Justice Gerald
W. VandeWalle, joined by then-Chief Justice Ralph J. Erickstad, con-
curred specially, arguing that it was inappropriate for the court to require
the State to prove the invalidity of Orr's prior conviction when Orr did
not claim he was not advised of his right to counsel at his prior trial, but
rather that he simply could not remember whether he was advised of this
right.3 1 Justice VandeWalle also indicated that he was not convinced that
the Lewis case was inapplicable to Orr's situation.3 2 Finally, and perhaps
most significantly, Justice VandeWalle stated that he did not believe that
the North Dakota Constitution necessarily provided any greater pro-
tection to an accused's right to counsel than the United States Consti-
tution. 33 He concluded, however, that under Rule 11(f) of the North
Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure, the fact that the record of Off's
prior conviction did not reflect a valid waiver of counsel provided
"sufficient reason" to conclude that it could not be used to enhance his
current conviction.3 4  Given this, he asserted that the "significant
constitutional issue" addressed by the majority should have been left for
another day.3 5
Irrespective of the philosophical undergirdings of the Orr opinion,
it has likely had a salutary effect upon the trial judges of North Dakota,
causing them to be more careful in the advice they give defendants in
criminal cases and in the records they keep, all of which should contrib-
ute not only to justice, but to the appearance of justice.
Should it be asserted that the North Dakota Supreme Court con-
cerned itself with trifles in Orr, it should be noted that, in City of Bis-
marck v. Altevogt,36 the court confirmed that it would jealously guard a
defendant's right to a jury trial even in the case of minor offenses.3 7
27. Id.
28. Id. at 180.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 180.
31. Id. at 180-81 (VandeWalle, J., concurring specially).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 181.
35. Id.
36. 353 N.W.2d 760 (N.D. 1984).
37. See City of Bismarck v. Altevogt, 353 N.W.2d 760, 764-66 (N.D. 1984).
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Justice Levine refers to Altevogt in support of her statement in Orr that
"we have often recognized that our constitution may afford broader
rights than those granted under the federal constitution." 38
B. DOMESTIC RELATIONS
1. Child Custody-Domestic Violence: Schestler v. Schestler
and Heck v. Reed
In her dissent to Schestler v. Schestler,39 Justice Levine challenged
the court's interpretation of North Dakota's statutory presumption
against awarding child custody to a perpetrator of domestic violence. 40
Wanda and Charles Schestler were divorced in 1991.41 The trial court
determined that it would be in the best interests of the couple's two
children to be in Charles' custody. 42 Wanda argued on appeal that the
trial court did not properly consider the impact of Charles' physical
abuse of her in making its custody decision. 43
The Schestler majority, speaking through Justice J. Phillip Johnson,
affirmed the trial court.44 The majority recognized that, under North
Dakota law, when "credible evidence of domestic violence" exists, it
creates "a rebuttable presumption against awarding custody .. . to the
abusive party." 45 The majority, however, did not interpret the domestic
violence statutes and supporting legislation to give "a priority for this
factor over other statutory factors the court is required to consider in
deciding the delicate issue of child custody." 46 At that time, the law of
North Dakota required the court to consider listed factors and "[a]ny
other factors considered by the court to be relevant to a particular child
custody dispute.."47 Based on its interpretation of the law and an exami-
nation of the circumstances of this case, the majority concluded:
Having carefully reviewed both the evidentiary record in this
case and the trial court's findings, we are satisfied that the trial
court gave consideration to the domestic violence factor and ap-
plied the statutory provisions on domestic violence. We are not
convinced that the trial court made a mistake in finding that the
statutory presumption against placing custody with Charles was
38. Orr, 375 N.W.2d at 178 n.6.
39. 486 N.W.2d 509 (N.D. 1992).
40. Schestler v. Schestler, 486 N.W.2d 509,514-15 (N.D. 1992) (Levine, J.. dissenting).




45. Id. at 511.
46. Id.
47. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.2(1) (1995).
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rebutted by other credible evidence. Consequently, we will not
set aside that finding.48
Justice Levine dissented from the majority decision, arguing that the
majority's interpretation of the effect of the statutory domestic violence
presumption "undermine[d] the purpose of the [law] and weaken[ed]
the legislative resolve." 49 She asserted that the legislature amended
North Dakota child custody law to include the domestic violence pre-
sumption because of the "failure of judges to treat seriously allegations
of domestic violence" and "to acknowledge that the perpetrator of
family violence is ordinarily not a proper person to have custody of
children ."50
Justice Levine granted that the trial court, after finding the existence
of domestic violence, recognized that a presumption arose against
awarding custody to the perpetrator.5 1 She argued that the trial court
erred, however, in finding the presumption to be rebutted because none
of the violence was directed at the children. 52 Through this action,
Justice Levine claimed, the trial court "denuded the statute of its good
intent."5 3 She asked:
What good is a statutory presumption that is based on the
legislature's recognition of the devastating effect on the entire
family of domestic violence perpetrated against any family
member, if that presumption may be overcome by a finding
that the family violence does not include beating the children?
That really is a ludicrous reading of a well-intentioned statute
and it gives us a ludicrous, and pathetic, result insofar as it
condones domestic violence that is not directly aimed at the
children. It turns the statute on its head while thumbing our
nose at the legislature .54
Justice Levine urged that legislative history indicated that the
domestic abuse presumption was designed to put the burden of proof on
the abuser to show fitness to be a custodial parent.55 She argued that the
trial court, "ignoring any propensity of the perpetrator toward violence,
took the burden of proof that the legislature had removed from the
shoulders of the victim of abuse and dropped it squarely back on." 56
48. Schestler, 486 N.W.2d at 512.
49. Id. at 513 (Levine, J., dissenting).
50. Id.
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By finding the domestic violence presumption to be overcome by
evidence that the perpetrator did not direct violence toward the children,
Justice Levine claimed, "the trial court misconstrued, misinterpreted and
misapplied the statute." 57
In addition, Justice Levine argued the majority compounded the
trial court's error by holding "that domestic violence is but one factor
to be considered along with other statutory factors." 58 She indicated
that this was the state of the law "[p]rior to the addition of the statutory
presumption." 59 Because the legislature does not perform idle acts, she
argued "the new statutory presumption must be interpreted as giving
domestic violence more weight in custody disputes than the other statu-
tory factors." 60 By failing to give the presumption its proper weight,
Justice Levine claimed, the majority "repealed the enactment of the
statutory presumption."61
Justice Levine did not speculate as to what the result in this case
would have been had the trial court given the domestic violence
presumption the effect she interpreted the law to require. 62 She simply
asked that the case be reversed and remanded so that the trial court could
"do it over and do it right." 63 In concluding, Justice Levine said that
"[d]omestic violence is not just one factor among many to be
considered. It is the only factor blessed by a presumption." 64
In Heck v. Reed,65 the North Dakota Supreme Court had the oppor-
tunity to interpret a newly amended version of North Dakota's child
custody statute in an opinion written by Justice Levine.66
Heck stemmed from a custody dispute between Christie Reed and
Shane Heck. 67 Heck and Reed lived together, "on and off," for about
two years and had two children. 68 After the pair separated for the last
time, Heck sought sole custody of the children. 69 At the custody hear-
ing, Reed introduced evidence, which the trial court found credible, that
Heck had "physically and verbally" abused her. 70  The trial court,
57. Id.






64. Id.; see also id. at 512 (applying equally the statutory best interests factors). It should be
noted that, in Swanston v. Swanston, 502 N.W.2d 506 (N.D. 1993), Justice Levine wrote for the
majority and applied the rule enunciated by the Schestler majority in affirming a trial court's custody
decision.
65. 529 N.W.2d 155 (N.D. 1995).
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however, granted custody to Heck, finding that "the interaction of
Shane's parents' with the children, Shane's 'desire to provide for the
children's needs,' Shane's 'more settled' living arrangement and
'Christie's smoking habits' to rebut the presumption against awarding
custody to Shane, a parent who had perpetrated domestic violence." 7 1
In analyzing whether the trial court erred in granting custody to
Heck, Justice Levine first looked at the history and interpretation of
North Dakota's statutory presumption against awarding child custody to
a perpetrator of domestic violence. 72 She concluded that the Schestler
court, which had interpreted the statute, held that evidence of domestic
violence "was no more important than the other factors the court must
consider when making its custody decision." 73 In the wake of Schestler,
Justice Levine observed, the legislature "significantly changed" the
language of the statutory domestic violence presumption, presumably
with an intent to change its meaning and in response to the court's
construction of the prior statute in Schestler.74 Under the amended
statute, Justice Levine asserted, "the presumption against awarding
custody to a parent who has perpetrated domestic violence may only be
rebutted by clear and convincing evidence." 75
Justice Levine said that, through this change, "the legislature
imposed a higher burden on the perpetrating parent than that required
under our previous law." 76 She next analyzed the requirements for
overcoming this burden and rebutting the presumption. 77 Justice Levine
observed that the legislature put the burden of proof on the perpetrator
of domestic violence to show that "the best interests of the children
require that the perpetrator be a custodial parent." 78 She indicated that
this is a high standard, meaning that the best interests of the child must
compel or demand placement of the child with the domestic violence
perpetrator before that person can be given custody. 79
Justice Levine suggested that, to show the best interests of the child
require custody in the perpetrator of domestic violence, that person must
meet the same "heightened standard of necessity" a parent seeking
custody modification or a non-parent seeking custody must meet.80 In
71. Id.
72. Id. at 159-61.
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other words, the abusive party must show "compelling or exceptional
circumstances" to overcome the presumption.8 1
In light of this conclusion, Justice Levine wrote that it would be
contrary to the intent of the legislature for a trial court, when the
statutory presumption against awarding custody to a perpetrator of
domestic violence is present, to find the presumption overcome "by
weighing in the perpetrator's favor some of ...[the] customary best-
interest factors."82
Heck argued that the trial court found the presumption to be
overcome based on its findings that he had never directed violence to the
children and that Reed's smoking posed a threat to their asthmatic
child. 83 Justice Levine and the court disagreed that this was enough to
overcome the presumption. 84
Justice Levine explained that the domestic violence statute precludes
an award of custody to a perpetrator of domestic violence regardless of
whether or not the perpetrator directed violence toward a child.85 She
indicated that if the legislature had desired to forbid awards of custody
only to those who are violent toward children, it would have used a more
restrictive term than "domestic violence," such as "child abuse." 86
Instead, the legislature used the term "domestic violence" and defined
that term as "harm to family and household members." 87
Justice Levine suggested that the court believed that the legisla-
ture's use and definition of the term "domestic violence" in the statute
reflected a "legislative finding that domestic violence has an adverse
effect on children which may be presumed whenever violence is present
in the household."8 8 In support of this conclusion, she reviewed some
of the "growing body of research" extant at the time of the legislature's
amendment of the statute, research indicating that "children are victim-
ized by the climate of violence created by domestic violence between
their parents, even if they are not direct targets of abuse." 89 She con-
cluded that, in light of this research, it would be an absurd and unjust
result to interpret the domestic violence statute to permit the presumption
against awarding custody to a perpetrator of domestic violence "to be
rebutted because the domestic violence was perpetrated on another
household member, and not the particular child."90
81. Id.








90. Id. at 164.
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Justice Levine also found the trial court's conclusion that there was
"'little likelihood of continued violence toward anyone"! to be mysteri-
ous considering research indicating that domestic violence is a "learned
pattern of behavior."91 She wrote that, in the absence of any evidence in
the record that Heck had sought treatment or had been rehabilitated
since he last perpetrated violence on Reed, it was clear error for the trial
court to have concluded that Heck "will no longer use domestic violence
as a means of controlling his intimate partners." 92
Finally, Justice Levine considered Heck's contention that Reed's
smoking was a harm to the children capable of rebutting the domestic
violence presumption. 93 She agreed that smoking was an appropriate
factor to consider in custody deliberations, and that second-hand smoke
can be harmful, especially to an asthmatic child, but she explained that
the court did not agree that the fact that "victim-parent" smokes to be
enough to trump the domestic violence presumption. 94 She suggested
that a court order prohibiting the smoking parent from smoking in the
presence of the children would be an appropriate step, rather than a
change of custody. 95 She concluded, overall, that the trial court erred in
finding that the presumption against awarding custody to a perpetrator
of domestic violence was overcome in this case.96
Justice Levine's opinion was joined wholly only by Justice
Meschke. 97 Chief Justice VandeWalle concurred in the result, interpret-
ing the majority opinion to state that the statute "requires that the
perpetrator of domestic violence not be awarded custody of a child
unless the other parent is unfit." 98 Justice Dale Sandstrom, joined by
Justice William Neumann, 99 agreed that the case should be returned to
the trial court "for specific findings and reconsideration as may be
appropriate," but did not agree with the majority's supplementation of
the record or its "trivializing the harm of cigarette smoke to an
asthmatic child."100 Justice Sandstrom asserted that "a judge's order
should not be necessary to create an obligation to stop smoking in the
child's presence" if that smoking threatens the child's health. 10 1
91. Id.





97. Id. at 166.
98. Id. (VandeWalle, CJ., concurring in the result).
99. Id. at 167 (Neumann, J., concurring).
100. Id. at 166 (Sandstrom, J., concurring in the result).
101. Id.
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2. Child Custody-Primary Caretaker: Gravning v. Gravning
In Gravning v. Gravning,0 2 Justice Levine wrote separately to urge
the court to adopt the primary caretaker test in child custody cases. 103
When Nancy and Greg Gravning divorced, the trial court gave each
of them custody of one of their two children.104 Both Nancy and Greg
argued that the trial court erred; Nancy argued she should have custody
of both children, and Greg argued that he should have custody.1 05
Justice Meschke, writing for the majority in Gravning, indicated that
"the trial court was concerned about a lack of cooperation in visitation,
while both children were in Nancy's custody during the year of
separation," and it observed that divided custody is a legitimate
approach to address visitation problems. 106 The court, therefore, affirm-
ed the trial court's decision, concluding "that divided custody was an ap-
propriate 'Solomonic' approach to the circumstances that the trial court
encountered in this case." 107
The court had previously characterized the "split custody" of a
single child for six months out of each year to each parent in Lapp v.
Lappl0 8 as "Solomonic."10 9 In Lapp, the court said:
While there are certain disadvantages to split or alternating
custody awards, there are also important advantages and
benefits to this Solomonic arrangement which are readily
apparent. Children need interaction and interrelationship with
their parents, siblings, and other persons who may significantly
affect the child's best interests.110
Justice Levine, dissenting, agreed that the trial court did not have an
easy task in determining custody, but argued that upholding the trial
court's decision was incorrect in the absence of "adequate factual
findings."' 11 Justice Levine indicated that, when split custody is
ordered, "the trial court's findings and conclusions should explicitly,
and in a particularized fashion, explain and justify why • splitting custody
is in the children's, best interests." 1 12 Applying this test, Justice Levine
102. 389 N.W.2d 621 (N.D. 1986).
103. Gravning v. Gravning, 389 N.W.2d 621,625 (N.D. 1986) (Levine, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 622.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 623.
107. Id.
108. 293 N.W.2d 121 (N.D. 1980).
109. Lapp v. Lapp, 293 N.W.2d 121, 130 (N.D. 1980).
110. Id.
111. Gravning, 389 N.W.2d at 624 (Levine, J., dissenting).
112. Id.
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concluded the trial court's findings were "simply insufficient" to
support its decision.11 3
Justice Levine argued that the court should not affirm the trial
court's order, but instead should "adopt the rule that when equally fit
parents seek custody of children too young to express a preference, and
one parent has been the primary caretaker of the children, custody
should be awarded to the primary caretaker."114
Justice Levine gave four reasons why adoption of the primary care-
taker rule would be advantageous."1 5 First, she claimed it would "gen-
erally be in the child's best interest to be with the primary caretaker
because of the "vital bonding" between this parent and the child.'16
Second, she claimed "continuity of care with the primary caretaker" is a
"predictor of a child's welfare about which there is agreement" and
using it as a standard would "inject a measure of needed certainty into
custody disputes."17 Third, she suggested that the primary caretaker
rule would "benefit the negotiation process between divorcing parents"
by giving the primary caretaker more bargaining leverage. 1 8 Last, she
argued that the rule was gender neutral, and could benefit either par-
ent.' 19 Justice Levine urged that, if the primary caretaker rule were in
effect, the facts of the case would dictate that Nancy be awarded custody
of both children.120
Finally, Justice Levine also indicated that she believed the majority
to be condoning the trial court's decision to split custody to punish
Nancy for her lack of cooperation in visitation.121 She stated she dis-
agreed with such an approach, and observed that "[t]he weight of
authority is that a custody award should not be used to punish a parent
for bad behavior."122 She argued the proper means to deal with visita-
tion problems was by contempt or modification proceedings.123
113. Id.
114. Id. at 624-25 (footnote omitted).







122. Id. (citation omitted).
123. Id. at 626.
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3. Spousal Support: Dick v. Dick, Beals v. Beals, and Wiege
v. Wiege
In Dick v. Dick, 124 Justice Levine addressed the issue of spousal
support in a dissenting opinion.125 Dick involved an appeal from a trial
court's award of spousal support and its division of property in a divorce
action. 126 The trial court awarded Maxine Dick $1,000 a month in
spousal support, to continue for four months after the divorce, and a
cash award of $85,165, which Justice Meschke, as author of the majority
opinion asserted, made up nearly half of the marital estate. 127 The Dick
majority affirmed the trial court's spousal support award, and its proper-
ty division, concluding that neither was "clearly erroneous." 128 In
reaching this conclusion, the court said:
We apply a limited scope of review -to many of the issues raised
in appeals from divorce judgments. The determination of the
value of marital property is treated as a finding of fact.. A trial
court's determinations on spousal support and property
division are findings of fact, which will not be set aside on
appeal unless clearly erroneous. Findings of fact are presump-
tively correct. The complaining party bears the burden of
demonstrating that findings are erroneous, and a finding is
clearly erroneous only when the reviewing court is left with a
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.
Simply because we might have viewed the evidence differently
does not entitle us to reverse the trial court. A choice between
two permissible views of the weight of the evidence is not
clearly erroneous. 129
Justice Levine disagreed with the majority opinion, arguing the
majority gave the spousal support issue "undeserved short shrift." 130
She observed that Maxine concentrated on a "homemaking career"
during her seventeen-year marriage and was therefore "necessarily
disadvantaged" by the divorce, both because it was no longer possible
for her to continue as a homemaker and because she was not qualified to
work in other than minimum wage jobs outside the home. 13 1 Justice
Levine noted that Maxine's interest in seeking education so she could
124. 414 N.W.2d 288 (N.D. 1987).
125. Dick v. Dick, 414 N.W.2d 288,293 (N.D. 1987).
126. Id. at 290.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 292.
129. Id. at 290 (citations omitted).
130. Id. at 292 (Levine, J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 293.
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pursue a career was "appropriate and realistic" given that she otherwise
would be forced to rely on a minimum wage job for support, and
therefore characterized the trial court's conclusion that Maxine was not
interested in educating herself as cavalier.132 Justice Levine concluded
that "[i]t is a mistake to deprive [Maxine] of a crack at improving her
life" and urged reversal and remand so the trial court could award "a
reasonable amount of spousal support for a reasonable duration." 133
Justice Levine revisited the topic of spousal support in 1994 in
separate concurring opinions in Beals v. Beals,134 and Wiege v. Wiege.135
Beals was the appeal of a divorce action, in which a trial court
divided property and awarded child support and spousal support.136
Ken Beals argued the trial court's award of $800 per month in spousal
support to his former spouse Cindy, to be paid for six years following
the divorce, exceeded both his ability to pay and Cindy's needs. 137 The
Beals majority, in an opinion written by Chief Justice VandeWalle,
affirmed the trial court's spousal support award, observing that the North
Dakota Supreme Court looked "favorably upon awards of 'rehabil-
itative' spousal support" as awarded by the trial court. 138 The majority
defined rehabilitative spousal support as "limited in duration and . . .
designed to afford disadvantaged spouses the opportunity to gain the
education, training, and experience necessary to become self-suffi-
cient." 139
Justice Levine specially concurred suggesting that "in a marriage of
long duration like the one at bar, rehabilitative support for a term of
years may not accomplish the rehabilitation intended." 140 Rehabilitative
support is not a cure-all, Justice Levine asserted, because "the economic
consequences of divorce for women are devastating."141 Justice Levine
pointed out that a woman's net worth declines after divorce, sometimes
into the negative range, while a man's typically improves.142 Newly
divorced women, especially those who have worked as homemakers for
long periods of time, may not be in a position to seek degrees or special-
ized training, Justice Levine explained. 143 Moreover, even with training,
these women may not be able to gain employment or a significant
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. 517 N.W.2d 413,418 (N.D. 1994).
135. 518 N.W.2d 708, 712-14 (N.D. 1994).
136. Beals v. Beals, 517 N.W.2d 413,415 (N.D. 1994).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 416.
139. Id. (citations omitted).
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income due to their long absence from the job market.144 Therefore,
Justice Levine concluded, Cindy and others in her position should be
entitled to permanent support if rehabilitative support does not allow
them to "overcome [their] lack of training, foregone education and
absence from the job market."1 45
In her separate opinion in Wiege, Justice Levine presented a direct
challenge to the North Dakota Supreme Court's "oft-stated 'prefer-
ence' for temporary rehabilitative support" and its precedent requiring
"6automatic termination of support upon the recipient's remarriage." 146
In Wiege, the trial court divided the marital estate equally, with Larry
Wiege keeping the farm and Dianne Wiege receiving $33,000 over ten
years at seven percent interest, with interest offset by spousal support
paid.147 The trial court also awarded Dianne Wiege $1,000 monthly
spousal support to continue for six years, or until Dianne received a
college degree, whichever came first, and then $300 a month spousal
support for life. 148 Larry Wiege, Dianne's former spouse, argued that
the trial court erred in awarding spousal support.149 Both parties charac-
terized the.trial court as having awarded Dianne $700 a month in rehab-
ilitative support for up to six years, and $300 a month permanent
support.150
The Wiege majority, speaking through Justice Meschke, in analyz-
ing whether the trial court's support award was proper, said:
A spouse must be disadvantaged as a result of the divorce for
rehabilitation or maintenance to be appropriate. We prefer
temporary rehabilitative support to remedy this disadvantage,
and indefinite permanent support is appropriate only if a
spouse "cannot be adequately restored to independent eco-
nomic status." Therefore, a trial court should consider rehabili-
tative support first because it may eliminate the need for
permanent support.151
It may have been this statement in the majority opinion which pre-
cipitated Justice Levine's special concurrence, but a dispassionate analy-
sis supports the view that the award was based more upon fundamental
principles than it was upon the preference for temporary rehabilitative
support. The Wiege majority referred specifically to the Ruff-Fisher
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Wiege v. Wiege, 518 N.W.2d 708, 712 (1994) (Levine, J., concurring).
147. Id. at 710.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 711.
151. Id. (citations omitted).
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guidelines when it made its support award.152 These guidelines are
outlined in Weir v. Weir. 15 3 In Wiege, the guideline allowing consid-
eration of "such other factors as may be material" may have been
especially significant.154
The Wiege majority ultimately affirmed the spousal support award,
concluding the trial court did not clearly err in finding Dianne disadvan-
taged by the divorce and in need of rehabilitative support and finding
Dianne likely not to be capable of complete rehabilitation and in need of
permanent support.155 The Weige majority also deflected Larry's
argument that the trial court erred by failing to order termination of
support on Dianne's remarriage, indicating that Larry could seek
modification of the support order if Dianne ever remarried.1 56 The
majority, however, indicated that the trial court's failure to specify that
Dianne's support would end if she ever remarried was error, because
"[u]nless there are extraordinary circumstances, spousal support will
terminate when the disadvantaged spouse remarries." 157
In her concurrence, Justice Levine first addressed the matter of the
court's "preference" for rehabilitative rather than permanent spousal
support.158 She asserted that rehabilitative support has "varied" purpos-
es: it can be used to restore a disadvantaged spouse to "independent
economic status" and also to "equalize the burden" of a divorce.159
She also observed, however, that rehabilitative support is not always
effective in achieving these ends, and that, in some instances, only
permanent support can remedy the "permanent disparity in earning
capacity" that divorce often places on a divorcing woman. 160
Justice Levine explained that, in marriage, one partner often forgoes
"career opportunities and advancement" so that the other can seek great-
er earning capacity-a mutually beneficial decision. 161 She observed:
Permanent support is the price to be paid for the earlier mutual
decision about the role to be played by each marital partner
when, in fact, the economically disadvantaged partner cannot
obtain, after training and reasonable time, the income necessary
to live a life comparable to the one prior to divorce or
152. Id.
153. 374 N.W.2d 858 (N.D. 1985).
154. See Wiege, 518 N.W.2d at 711.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 712.
157. Id. at 711.
158. Id. at 712 (Levine, J., concurring).
159. Id.
160. Id. at 713.
161. Id.
930 [VOL. 72:915
JUSTICE BERYL LEVINE'S VIEW
comparable to the higher earner's post-divorce reduced
standard of living.162
Permanent support, Justice Levine concluded, "is another part of
the arsenal available to restore economic equity to a partner of a failed
marital enterprise" and should not be "overlooked" due to a "prefer-
ence" for rehabilitative support.163
Furthermore, Justice Levine wrote, if spousal support "is viewed
properly as compensation for lost career opportunities and advancement,
then a recipient's remarriage should not automatically terminate that
support ... the debtor's obligation to repay those debts should continue
whether or not the creditor forms a new enterprise."164 Justice Levine
conjectured that the trial court may have decided to omit a support
termination provision from the support order because it determined that
Larry owed Dianne a debt, compensation for her "economic disability,"
regardless of whether or not she remarried.165 Justice Levine suggested
that such an approach made sense under the modem view of marriage as
a partnership, rather than the former view of marriage as an institution in
which the husband assumed permanent support for his wife until another
husband came along to support her.166 Post divorce support, concluded
Justice Levine, is "a cost of the failed marriage," and should continue
until "economic parity is obtained" between the two former partners or
"if such parity is unattainable, for the duration established in the
judgment."1 67
C. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
1. First Amendment: City of Bismarck v. Schoppert
A city disorderly conduct ordinance collided with the First Amend-
ment in City of Bismarck v. Schoppert.168 The court, in an opinion
written by Justice Levine, reversed Thomas Schoppert's disorderly
conduct conviction, concluding the jury instructions given were flawed





166. Id. at 714.
167. Id. This position is in contradistinction with the views expressed in prior decisions by the
court that, except under extraordinary circumstances, a party's obligation to support a marital partner
ends when the other partner to the marriage marries another. See Nastrom v. Nastrom, 262 N.W.2d
487, 490 (N.D. 1978); Nugent v. Nugent, 152 N.W.2d 323, 327 (N.D. 1967).
168. 469 N.W.2d 808 (N.D. 1991).
169. City of Bismarck v. Schoppert, 469 N.W.2d 808, 813 (N.D. 1991).
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The case arose from an incident in which Schoppert directed foul
language and vulgar gestures toward several Bismarck police officers
during an early-morning confrontation. 170 The police arrested Schop-
pert for disorderly conduct, and he was ultimately convicted by a jury
for the offense.171
Schoppert appealed, arguing that Bismarck's disorderly conduct
ordinance, as applied to him, violated the First Amendment.172 In
particular, Schoppert challenged the jury instructions given by the court,
which stated (in part) that:
A person who, with intent to harass, annoy, or alarm another
person knowingly or in reckless disregard of the fact that an-
other person is harassed, annoyed or alarmed by his behavior,
in a public place uses abusive or obscene language, or makes
an obscene gesture, which language or gesture by its very utter-
ance or gesture inflicts injury or tends to incite an immediate
breach of the peace, is guilty of disorderly conduct.173
Schoppert argued that including the phrase "inflicts injury" in the
instruction, in his case, "allowed the jury to convict him for conduct that
is constitutionally protected."1 74 Justice Levine, writing for the court,
agreed.1 75
In her analysis of the instructions, Justice Levine reviewed a series of
the United States Supreme Court's First Amendment cases. 176 She
observed that the "inflicts injury" language contained in the challenged
jury instructions and in the Bismarck disorderly conduct ordinance was
derived from Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,177 in which the Court said
the First Amendment "does not prevent a state from punishing the
speaking of 'insulting or "fighting" words - those which by- their very
utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the
peace."'178
Justice Levine indicated that the Court did not define the term
"inflict injury" in Chaplinsky, and that the Court later "edited" the
phrase out of the Chaplinsky test. 179 Justice Levine observed that the
Court made clear, in the process of refining the Chaplinsky test, that "the
170. Id. at 809.
171. Id. at 809-10.




176. Id. at 810-13.
177. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
178. Schoppert, 469 N.W.2d at 810-11 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,
572 (1942)).
179. Id. at 811.
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fact that words are vulgar or offensive is not sufficient to remove them
from the protection of the first amendment and into the arena in which
the state can make conduct criminal."1 80 She concluded that "[i]t is
thus not a crime in this country to be a boor, absent resort to fighting
words," which are "'personally abusive epithets which, when addressed
to the ordinary citizen, are, as a matter of common knowledge, inherent-
ly likely to provoke violent reaction."' 181
Justice Levine next discussed the existence of a "police officers'
exception" to the "fighting words doctrine." 182 Schoppert claimed that
the North Dakota Supreme Court had adopted such an exception in City
of Bismarck v. Nassif.183 Under the "police officers' exception," police
officers would be required to "exercise a higher degree of restraint" to
fighting words than the average person.1 84 Responding to Schoppert's
argument, Justice Levine rejected the suggestion that the Nassif court
adopted the exception, but she said "that whether particular words are
'fighting words' depends on the circumstances of their utterance and the
fact that the words are spoken to police is a significant circumstance." 185
Based on her analysis of First Amendment law, Justice Levine
examined the challenged jury instructions. 186 She indicated that "the
instructions given by the trial court allowed the jury to convict if it found
Schoppert used abusive language that either (1) tended to incite an
immediate breach of the peace or (2) inflicted injury by -its very utter-
ance." 1 8 7 She concluded that only the first option met constitutional
requirements. 188  Because a conviction based on unconstitutional
grounds cannot stand; Justice Levine, shifted her focus to whether the
evidence supported Schoppert's conviction on constitutional grounds-
for using language tending "to incite an immediate breach of the
peace."18 9
Justice Levine reported that the police witnesses had testified that
Schoppert's conduct "angered," "alarmed," and "agitated" them, but
they also testified "that Schoppert's vulgar speech would not incite them
to violence." 190 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
verdict, Justice Levine concluded the evidence was not sufficient to
180. Id.
181. Id. at 811-12 (quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971)).
182. Id. at 812.
183. Id. at 811 (citing City of Bismarck v. Nassif, 449 N.W.2d 789 (N.D. 1989)).
184. Id. at 812 (quoting Lewis v. New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 135 (1974) (Powell, J.,
concurring)).






190. Id. at 813.
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support Schoppert's conviction.191 The court ordered the vacation of
Schoppert's conviction and entry of judgment of acquittal. 192
While Justice Levine's opinion in Schoppert was the opinion of the
court, she was joined fully only by Justice Meschke. 193 Then-Chief
Justice Erickstad concurred in the result "reluctantly," and wrote
separately to express his displeasure at the behavior displayed by Schop-
pert, a lawyer.194 He warned that "being uncouth, foul-mouthed, and
vulgar is not something we should encourage on the part of members of
the bar."195 Then-Justice VandeWalle, joined by Justice Gierke, also
concurred in the result, agreeing that the First Amendment protects even
"offensive deportment by those whom we expect to exhibit better
judgment."196 He emphasized, however, that he did not concede that
"the fact the person at whom epithets are directed is a police officer"
should be "the only factor or the controlling factor" in determining
whether words are fighting words. 197
2. Equal Protection-Juries: City of Mandan v. Fern
In City of Mandan v. Fern,198 Justice Levine, writing for the North
Dakota Supreme Court, confronted the question of whether or not the
Constitution bars gender-based peremptory challenges.1 99 Scott Fern
was convicted of driving under the influence by a jury of four women
and two men. 200 The prosecutor had used three peremptory challenges
to strike three men from the jury. 20 1 Fern argued that the prosecutor's
use of gender-based peremptory challenges violated his right to equal
protection under Batson v. Kentucky202 and the Fourteenth Amendment
to the Federal Constitution.203
In Batson, the United States Supreme Court concluded that the use
of race-based peremptory challenges violated equal protection because it
"harms the excluded jurors, undermines public confidence in the
judicial system and stimulates community prejudice." 204 The Batson




194. Id. (Erickstad, CJ., concurring specially).
195. Id.
196. Id. (VandeWalle, J., concurring specially).
197. Id.
198. 501 N.W.2d 739 (N.D. 1993).
199. City of Mandan v. Fern, 501 N.W.2d 739,742 (N.D. 1993).
200. Id. at 742.
201. Id.
202. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
203. Fern, 501 N.W.2d at 742.
204. Id. at 743 (citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87 (1986)).
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Alabama,20 5 in which the Court held that race-based peremptory
challenges violated the Equal Protection Clause and, at the same time,
imposed an "unforgiving evidentiary burden" for proving such vio-
lations. 20 6 Under Swain, a defendant claiming "purposeful discrimina-
tion" was required to show a pattern of discriminatory peremptory
challenges over time to make a prima facie case. 207 Under Batson, a
defendant was allowed to make a showing of "purposeful discrimination
during jury selection based solely on the facts of that particular defen-
dant's case." 208
At the time of the Fern decision, the United States Supreme Court
had not decided whether or not gender-based peremptory challenges
violated equal protection. 209 Therefore, Justice Levine relied on a series
of cases from federal circuit courts of appeal and state appellate courts in
deciding if the Constitution barred gender-based peremptory chal-
lenges. 210 In particular, Justice Levine found the reasoning of the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. DeGross211 to be "enlight-
ened and enlightening." 212
The court in DeGross concluded that gender-based peremptory
challenges were harmful for many of the same reasons race-based
peremptory challenges were harmful: both types stimulate community
prejudice and "bear no relationship to an individual's qualifications or
ability to perform." 213 Moreover, both types of discriminatory chal-
lenges "are based either on the false assumption that members of a
certain group are either unqualified to serve as jurors, or unable to
consider impartially the case against a member ... of their group." 2 14
Justice Levine pointed out that courts review claims of "alleged sex
discrimination" under an intermediate standard of review. 215 Under this
standard, the key question in Fern, was "whether a peremptory chal-
lenge which is grounded on a venireperson's sex is substantially related
to achieving a fair and impartial jury." 216 Justice Levine stated that the
court in DeGross decided gender-base peremptory challenges to be
unconstitutional because "gender-based challenges do not aid in achiev-
ing [a] fair and impartial jur[y]." 217
205. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).




210. Id. at 744-46.
211. 960 F.2d 1433 (9th Cir. 1991).
212. Fern, 501 N.W.2d at 744.




217. Id. at 745.
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Justice Levine compared the efforts of the courts in eliminating
racial, as compared to gender, discrimination in the courtroom. 218 She
observed that more than a century of jurisprudence had been devoted to
eliminating "'race prejudice within the jury selection process."' 219 On
the other hand, Justice Levine asserted, "[g]ender bias in the courtroom
has only lately been acknowledged and addressed." 220 She also signifi-
cantly pointed out that "[it was not until 1971 that gender discrimina-
tion was first held to violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment." 221 Justice Levine commented that as a result of years of
gender bias in the courts, gender stereotypes lived on in jury selection.222
Therefore, she concluded, "there is both need and justification . . . to
extend Batson principles to gender discrimination." 223
Justice Levine explained that, in deciding that gender-based per-
emptory challenges were violative of equal protection, the court rejected
the view expressed in United States v. Broussard,224 which had upheld
such challenges as constitutional. 225 The court in Fern agreed with the
court in Broussard which concluded that race-based classifications were
essentially different from gender-based classifications, in part because
"'women are not numerical minorities.' 226 Justice Levine character-
ized this as a "fling-the-gauntlet rationale" that "overlooks entirely the
excluded venireperson's right to equal protection." 227
In selecting a jury, Justice Levine wrote:
Process, not product, is the key. When the process is riddled
with unfair, unseemly and unacceptable gender discrimination,
it is of small moment that the process did not entirely contami-
nate the product. What it does contaminate is public confi-
dence in a judicial process that condones systematic, blatant
gender discrimination in the selection of juries. 228
If the court did not extend Batson, Justice Levine observed, it would be
perpetuating institutionalized gender-bias.229
Justice Levine noted that the trial court had not decided "whether
Fern established a prima facie case of gender discrimination." 230 She
218. Id.
219. id. (quoting Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2081 (1991)).
220. Id.
221. Id. at 746.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. 987 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1993).
225. Fern, 501 N.W.2d at 747.
226. Id. (quoting United States v. Broussard, 987 F.2d 215, 220 (5th Cir. 1993)).
227. Id. at 747-48.
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observed that this determination, along with the decision as to whether
the prosecution could offer a gender-neutral explanation for its chal-
lenges, was one for the trial court.2 31 She therefore provided guidance,
based on Batson, on how the trial court should evaluate gender-bias
claims and responses and the case was remanded for "proceedings
consistent" with the opinion. 232
Justice Levine was joined wholly in the Fern opinion only by Justice
Meschke. 233 Chief Justice VandeWalle concurred specially, joined by
Justices Sandstrom and Neumann. 234 Chief Justice VandeWalle agreed
that the court "should not condone gender discrimination in jury
selection or elsewhere." 235 He questioned, however, whether trial courts
should apply the procedure outlined in Batson to determine if a defen-
dant had raised a prima-facie case of gender discrimination in jury
selection. 236 He indicated that, under the Batson procedure, every per-
emptory strike could be questioned because "[e]very peremptory strike
will necessarily involve a woman or a man." 237
Instead, Chief Justice VandeWalle suggested that the Swain proce-
dure might better suit cases of alleged gender discrimination in jury
selection. 238 Under this procedure, a defendant could make a prima-
facie showing of gender discrimination by showing "that the prosecu-
tion in case after case" removed persons of a given gender from juries
in given situations. 239 Chief Justice VandeWalle asserted that "[t]here
may be other procedures which would accomplish the purpose of protect-
ing against gender discrimination in the selection of a jury panel" and
indicated a willingness to consider such alternatives. 240 Ultimately, he
agreed that a remand was required in Fern's case.241
The United States Supreme Court, a year after the Fern decision,
held in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.242 that gender-based peremptory
challenges violate equal protection. 243 It appears that the highest court
in the land applied a rationale similar to that used by Justice Levine. 244
The Supreme Court in J.E.B., like Justice Levine in Fern, concluded that
231. Id.
232. Id. at 748-50.
233. Id. at 750.
234. Id.







242. 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994).
243. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1430 (1994).
244. See id. (stating that if persons are excluded from the jury process based solely on gender
then the integrity of the judicial system would be compromised).
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the Batson standard should be applied to determine whether or not a
given peremptory challenge is discriminatory.245
D. TORT LAW
1. Fraud: Holcomb v. Zinke
In Holcomb v. Zinke,246 the North Dakota Supreme Court conclud-
ed that the age-old doctrine of caveat emptor does not necessarily
continue to govern transactions between strangers. 247 The Zinkes sought
to sell a home they owned in rural Jamestown and listed the home with a
local real estate agency. 248 Real estate agents showed the home to the
Holcombs, who decided to buy it.249 After moving into the home,
however, the Holcombs discovered the home had numerous problems,
none of which had been disclosed to them prior to the purchase and
which apparently were not evident upon casual perusal. 250 For example,
the sellers' agents represented that "the house was almost new, in
excellent shape, and that everything was in good condition as far as they
knew." 25 1 Notwithstanding that representation, soon after the Holcombs
moved in "they discovered that the tap water emitted an offensive odor,
and that the dishwasher, garbage disposal, TV antenna, water softener,
and kitchen heating system were defective. On December 1, 1981, and
on several occasions thereafter, the sewage system backed up, flooding
the basement."252
The Holcombs had "viewed the premises for about one hour but
did not inspect the appliances, the sewage system, or the water system"
prior to moving in. 253 They attempted to fix the problems, but ultimate-
245. Id. at 1429-30. Justice O'Connor, in a special concurrence to J.E.B., gave what appears to
be a caveat to the majority decision. She wrote that "today's important blow against gender
discrimination is not costless." Id. at 1431. She further asserted that "today's holding should be limited
to the government's use of gender-based peremptory strikes." Id. Justice O'Connor indicated that
she took this position because "today's decision further erodes the role of the peremptory challenge."
Id. It is also significant that Chief Justice Rehnquist authored a dissenting opinion in J.E.B. and with
Justice Thomas joined in Justice Scalia's dissent, in which Justice Scalia asserted that: "[M]uch
damage has been done. It has been done, first and foremost, to the peremptory challenge system,
which loses it whole character when (in order to defend against 'impermissible stereotyping' claims)
'reasons' for strikes must be given." Id. at 1438 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia, further, could
not discern how the complaining party had suffered injury when, "for every man struck by the
government petitioner's own lawyer struck a woman." Id. at 1437. Justice Scalia, however, did not
deny that the jurors' rights and duties to serve were affected by the gender-based strikes.
246. 365 N.W.2d 507 (N.D. 1985).
247. Holcomb v. Zinke, 365 N.W.2d 507, 511 (N.D. 1985).
248. Id. at 509.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 510.
251. Id. at 509.
252. Id. at 510.
253. Id. at 509. This case may be distinguishable from Sperle v. Weigel, 130 NW.2d 315, 320
(N.D. 1964), in which a buyer brought suit against a seller of an apartment building that turned out to
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ly sought rescission of the purchase.254 The Zinkes refused to rescind,
and the case went to court. 255 The trial court, among other things, found
the Zinkes suppressed material facts about the home and ultimately
granted rescission.256
Justice Levine, writing for the court, first considered whether the
trial court erred in granting rescission. 257 She indicated that the law re-
quired proof that: "(1) the Holcombs' consent to enter into the contract
was obtained through fraud; (2) the Holcombs exercised reasonable
diligence in rescinding promptly upon discovery of the fraud; and (3)
the Holcombs restored the status quo." 258
Justice Levine observed that the trial court found the Zinkes to have
suppressed material facts and their agents to have made affirmative
misrepresentations, but that the trial court did not specify whether this
amounted to actual or constructive fraud.259 She wrote, however, that the
trial court had relied on a case involving constructive fraud in reaching
its conclusions and that the facts of the case suggested the presence of
constructive fraud. 260 She explained that "[c]onstructive fraud is based
on a relationship between the parties which gives rise to a duty of
disclosure." 261 Justice Levine indicated that, historically, such a duty
would not arise among buyers and sellers of real estate because the rule
of caveat emptor protected the sellers. 262 She observed, however, that
"[wihile such a rule may have had some merit in the agrarian society in
which it was applied, the same cannot be said for its continued applica-
tion to the complexities of our society." 263
Therefore, after some discussion of the history of the rule, Justice
Levine concluded:
that in cases of passive concealment by the seller of defective
real property, there is an exception to the rule of caveat emptor,
applicable to this case, which imposes a duty on the seller to
disclose material facts which are known or should be known to
the seller and which wouldnot be discoverable by the buyer's
exercise of ordinary care and diligence. 264
have numerous obvious or patent problems. The court in Sperle decided that the sellers' did not
misrepresent the condition of the building prior to the sale notwithstanding that they told the buyer
among other things that it was a "real good" building. Id. at 317.





259. Id. at 511 (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § § 9-09-08, 9-03-09).
260. Id. (citing Asleson v. West Branch Land Co., 311 N.W.2d 533 (N.D. 1981)).
261. Id. (quoting Asleson, 311 N.W.2d at 535).
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 512 (citing Lingschu v. Savage, 29 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1963); Wilhite v. Mays, 232 S.E.2d
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Turning to the facts of the case, Justice Levine found that the
record provided ample support for the trial court's finding that the
Zinkes knew about problems with their home and failed to disclose these
problems to the Holcombs. 265 She further found that the record showed
the problems involved in this case to be both material and not reasonably
discoverable, and concluded that the Zinkes therefore breached their
duty to the Holcombs by. not disclosing material facts. 266 Overall, Justice
Levine concluded that the trial court's finding of constructive fraud was
supported by the record. 267 Based primarily on this factor, Justice
Levine, writing for a unanimous court, concluded that the trial court's
decision granting rescission should be affirmed.268
2. Products Liability: Butz v. Werner
In Butz v. Werner,269 Justice Levine wrote a dissenting opinion
which called for a products liability case relied on by the majority to be
overruled.
Charles Butz, Jr., was injured while riding behind a boat on an
inner-tube like device called the "Super Tube." 270 Butz brought a
negligence and strict products liability action against several parties
involved in the sale and distribution of the Super Tube.27 1 A jury
allocated fault separately on Butz's negligence and strict product liabili-
ty claims, and found his damages totaled $550,479.79.272 The trial court
entered judgment for Butz on the strict products liability claim, and the
seller and the distributor of the Super Tube appealed. 273
The majority, in an opinion written by Justice Gierke, affirmed the
trial court's judgment. 274 Throughout the opinion in Butz, Justice
Gierke relied heavily on Mauch v. Manufacturers Sales & Service,
Inc.,27 5 an earlier strict products liability and negligence case written by
then-Justice VandeWalle. 276 InMauch, the court had held that:
recovery sought under a negligent failure-to-warn theory and
recovery sought under a products-liability theory of marketing
a product which is defective and unreasonably dangerous
141 (Ga. Ct. App. 1976); Posner v. Davis, 395 N.E.2d 133 (I11. App. Ct. 1979); Hauck v. Samus, 321
N.W.2d 68 (Neb. 1982); Smith v. National Resort Communities, Inc., 585 S.W.2d 655 (Tex. 1979)).
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 513.
268. Id. at 514.
269. 438 N.W.2d 509 (N.D. 1989).
270. Butz v. Werner, 438 N.W.2d 509, 510 (N.D. 1989).
271. Id.
272. Id. at 510-11.
273. Id. at 511.
274. Id. at 510.
275. 345 N.W.2d 338 (N.D. 1984).
276. See Mauch v. Manufacturers Sales & Serv., Inc., 345 N.W.2d 338 (N.D. 1984).
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because it is not accompanied by adequate warnings are two
separate and distinct theories of recovery. Thus the trial court
must instruct on each where there is evidence to support both
theories .277
In Butz, the defendants argued the trial court erred by not requiring
the jury to allocate fault on the negligence and strict product liability
claims "on a combined fault assessment form." 278 Instead, the trial
court had allowed the jury to allocate fault for the two claims on two
forms. 279 The majority found the trial court's actions to be proper, and
concluded:
We can discern no reason why a plaintiff who can prove two
separate causes of action, and thus two separate wrongs by the
defendant, should be required to risk diminution of his recov-
ery because he prevails on both theories. If the plaintiff can
prove two separate theories he is entitled to have the jury
instructed on the separate theories, to have fault assessed
separately on each theory, and to have judgment entered on the
theory which provides the greater recovery. 280
In a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Meschke, Justice Levine
took issue with the majority's conclusion, and with the rationale under-
girding it, as embodied in the Mauch opinion. Commenting on Mauch,
Justice Levine observed:
Unfortunately, this court .. held that not only a strict liability
instruction, but also, a negligence instruction must be given in
failure-to-warn cases. That was unfortunate in my view and it
is that aspect of Mauch-that both instructions should be given,
that I think is untenable and should be overruled. 281
Justice Levine granted that negligent failure to warn and strict
liability failure to warn are different bases for recovery. 282 Yet, she
argued "negligence and strict liability overlap on the issue of duty to
warn." 283 She explained that this was the case because, while strict
product liability cases generally must focus on the product itself, "the
duty to warn case necessarily implicates a manufacturer's conduct over
and above the dangerousness of the product because it is the manufac-
turer's conduct of failing to prepare an adequate warning, that renders
277. Id. at 345.
278. Butz, 438 N.W.2d at 515.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 516.
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the product dangerous." 284 Therefore, she wrote, "some sort of 'rea-
sonable person' standard inheres in the issue of a failure to warn."
285
Furthermore, "there lurks within strict liability the familiar negligence
element of foreseeability that a product will be unreasonably dangerous
in its foreseeable use by foreseeable users without a warning."
286
Because of these factors, Justice Levine concluded, it is difficult, if
not impossible, for juries to distinguish between strict liability and
negligence issues in failure to warn cases. 287 She therefore argued that
Mauch should be overruled, and that North Dakota "embrace the
Minnesota Supreme Court's example of merging strict liability and
negligence in cases of failure to warn." 288 Under such an approach, she
contended, a trial court could consider the distinctions between strict
liability and negligence issues in determining whether to send a case to
the jury, and "to avoid the risk of perverse verdicts, the issue of failure
to warn should be removed from any strict liability defective condition
instruction and be submitted as a separate negligence issue." 289 In the
alternative, Justice Levine suggested, a party could "elect to submit to
the jury in a failure to warn case either a strict liability or negligence
theory." 290 Adoption of such an approach, Justice Levine wrote, would
eliminate the problems created by attempting to combine negligence and
strict liability theories on one verdict form. 291 "I do see great value in
presenting to the jury the issue of failure to warn in a manner that
de-emphasizes doctrinal labels, obviates confusion and is comprehensi-
ble, consistent and conducive to rendering justice," she concluded.
292
Then-Justice VandeWalle joined the majority opinion and wrote
separately to respond to Justice Levine's dissent. 293 Justice VandeWalle
argued that Justice Levine's conclusion "not only inhibits the growth of
the law but it is elitist and denigrates the competence of the jurors."
294
"We should not promote a philosophy that only judges are capable of
determining 'difficult' issues," Justice VandeWalle wrote. 295 Justice
VandeWalle observed that products liability law was a fairly new develop-
ment that had "exploded on the scene in the last two decades."
296
Given this, he asserted, it was not surprising products liability was not as




288. Id. at 523.




293. Id. at 518 (VandeWalle, J.. concurring specially).
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developed as negligence law. 297 He said that, in the failure to warn
context, some courts refused to recognize the cause of action, others
(like Minnesota and the dissent) took a middle ground, and some even
refused to instruct on negligence when a strict liability theory was
available .298
Justice VandeWalle, however, indicated that he agreed "with those
jurisdictions which hold that there is no valid reason to require a plaintiff
to elect whether to proceed on the theory of strict liability in tort or on
the theory of negligence." 299 He observed:
It is conceivable that the plaintiff may desire instructions on
both theories in order to argue to the jury those unreasonable
acts of the defendant which the plaintiff believes prove the
negligence theory and further to argue that if the jury deter-
mines those acts not unreasonable, and thus not negligent, it
should turn its focus from those acts to the product and the
danger it poses to the public. The theories are alternative and
permit the plaintiff to argue to the jury a second choice, not
entirely unlike the opportunity provided by a lesser-included-
offense instruction in a criminal case. I do not believe the
plaintiff should be denied that right because of the possibility
of jury confusion. The plaintiff has as much to risk as the
defendant if the jury is confused. The plaintiff should retain
the right to present all theories to the jury for which there is
support in the evidence.3 00
Justice VandeWalle argued that other methods, such as the use of
special verdict forms and the proper instruction of juries, existed to solve
the potential problem of inconsistent verdicts in failure to warn cases.3 0 1
Adopting the dissent's approach instead, he wrote, would disrupt the
orderly development of the law.3 02 Justice VandeWalle concluded that
"[t]he law should be permitted to take its normal course and the plaintiff
should be permitted to submit to the jury all accepted theories which a
plaintiff entitled to a jury trial is entitled to plead and prove." 30 3
The position of Justice VandeWalle and the majority in Butz seems
to have prevailed in North Dakota. In Crowston v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co.,304 a failure to warn case, the court, in an opinion written by
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 520.
300. Id.
301. Id. at 520-21.
302. Id. at 521.
303. Id.
304. 521 N.W.2d 401 (N.D. 1994).
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Chief Justice VandeWalle, reaffirmed the principle that "negligence and
strict liability in tort are separate and distinct theories of products liabili-
ty, each with a different focus." 305 Chief Justice VandeWalle wrote for a
unanimous court in Crowston, Justice Levine being disqualified due to
the participation of her former law firm in the action.
3. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress: Swenson v.
Northern Crop Insurance, Inc.
Justice Levine concurred specially in Swenson v. Northern Crop
Insurance, Inc.306 saying she joined the majority opinion "while regis-
tering but one small difference." 307 A summary of these differences in
her own words follows:
I am not prepared to say in this case, that sex discrimination in
obtaining employment or a promotion, without more, may not
constitute sufficiently outrageous conduct to raise a jury
question. With that difference noted, I concur in the rest of the
opinion authored by former Chief Justice Erickstad. 308
In this way, Justice Levine expressed deep feelings on a subject close to
her heart: the impact of gender bias.
Catherine Swenson started work at Northern Crop Insurance, Inc., as
a secretary and clerk. 309 When the office manager resigned, he recom-
mended that Swenson take his place. 310 However, John Krabseth, one of
Northern's officers, allegedly told Swenson "that he needed a 'man
fresh out of college' to fill the position, not a woman." 311 Nonetheless,
Northern's board gave Swenson the job.312
After Swenson received her promotion, Krabseth allegedly began
harassing her, "making derogatory and sexist comments to Swenson
concerning her gender." 3 13 He also allegedly threatened to replace her
with a man "because he would not tolerate a woman in a management
position making a high salary." 314
Krabseth reorganized the office. 3 15 He eliminated Swenson's
management position and slashed her pay. 3 16 He hired "two young
305. Crowston v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 521 N.W.2d 401,406 (N.D. 1994).
306. 498 N.W.2d 174 (N.D. 1993).
307. Swenson v. Northern Crop Ins., Inc., 498 N.W.2d 174, 187 (N.D. 1993) (Levine, J.,
concurring specially).
308. Id.
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men" to fill new jobs that paid more than Swenson's. 317 Swenson
complained to the board, which allegedly refused to help her; she
attempted to confront Krabseth, who allegedly purposefully avoided
her.318 As a result of these alleged events, Swenson claimed, her emo-
tional condition deteriorated and she was required to renew treatment for
alcoholism.319
Northern, and Krabseth, on the other hand, claimed:
that Swenson was demoted not as a result of her gender, but
because her position was phased out during the reorganiza-
tion-she was no longer needed in that capacity because the
position no longer existed. They also assert[ed] that Swenson
was not qualified for the two new positions, and that the new
positions were different from any of her former positions. 320
Swenson ultimately quit her job and sued Northern and Krabseth,
claiming gender discrimination, violation of North Dakota's equal pay
provisions, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. 321 It is with
the latter claim that we shall devote most of our attention in this review.
The trial court granted summary judgment against Swenson, and she
appealed .322
The Swenson majority, speaking through Surrogate Judge
Erickstad, first dealt with the issue of gender discrimination under North
Dakota's anti-discrimination statute.323 The majority concluded that,
under "clear and unambiguous" statutory terms, Swenson did not
qualify for relief under the anti-discrimination statute because Northern
did not fit the statute's definition of "employer." 324 The majority also
concluded that Swenson had failed to properly raise the issue of whether
or not the Act was constitutional. 325
The majority in Swenson next dealt with Swenson's claim that
Northern violated North Dakota's equal pay statute in its treatment of
her.326 The majority concluded Swenson raised disputed material facts
in making this claim, and that the trial court erred in granting summary




320. Id. at 177.
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. Id.; see also N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 14-02.4 (1991 & Supp. 1995) (North Dakota's antidiscrimi-
nation statute).
324. Swenson, 498 N.W.2d at 177.
325. Id.
326. Id. at 178-79; see also N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 34-06.1 (1987 & Supp. 1995) (North Dakota's
equal pay statute).
327. Id. at 179-80.
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therefore, reversed and remanded "for a determination of Swenson's
equal pay claim." 328
The most significant part of the Swenson majority opinion deals
with Swenson's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, which is
covered under Part III of the opinion. 329 The majority reviewed the
explanation of intentional infliction of emotional distress given in
section 46 of the Resiatement (Second) of Torts, which indicated that the
tort "is narrowly limited to outrageous conduct which exceeds 'all
possible bounds of decency."' 330  The majority also referred to
Muchow v. Lindblad,331 as "[the leading case" on intentional infliction
of emotional distress in North Dakota.332 Under Muchow, which was
written by Justice Levine, and the Restatement, intentional infliction of
emotional distress has three elements: "(1) extreme and outrageous
conduct that is (2) intentional or reckless and that causes (3) severe
emotional distress."333
Because the trial court had dismissed Swenson's claim on summary
judgment, the majority did not examine whether or not Swenson's claim
could have satisfied these elements. Instead, the majority explained that
"the trial court has an important and primary role" when an intentional
infliction of emotional distress claim is raised because it makes the
preliminary determination whether or not a given case contains conduct
extreme enough to be presented to the jury.334 Where "'reasonable
[people] may differ"' on whether conduct is extreme and outrageous, it
is for a jury to decide whether it warrants liability. 335
After a careful survey of the law on the issue, and the facts of
Swenson's case, the majority concluded that summary judgment of
dismissal was improperly granted. 336 In reaching this decision, the
majority considered not only Swenson's claim of alleged gender dis-
crimination, but also two additional factors: (1) Swenson's status as a
subordinate employee to Krabseth; and (2) Swenson's claim Krabseth
allegedly conducted himself as he did with knowledge of Swenson's
deteriorating emotional condition. 337 In so concluding the majority
warned:
328. Id. at 180.
329. Id. at 181.
330. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d).
331. 435 N.W.2d 918 (N.D. 1989).
332. Swenson, 498 N.W.2d at 181.
333. Id. (quoting Muchow v. Lindblad, 435 N.W.2d 918, 923-24 (N.D. 1989)).
334. Id. at 182.
335. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. h).
336. See id. at 182-86.
337. See id.
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In reversing the summary judgment dismissal of this issue, we
are not espousing the view that every instance of discrimination
equals or constitutes extreme and outrageous conduct as a
matter of law. Instead, we are saying that in this case it is
unclear whether the alleged conduct is extreme and outrageous,
or, in other words, we believe that reasonable persons could
disagree as to that issue. Therefore, it is a question for the jury
and an improper issue for summary judgment. 338
The majority's final comment provided a springboard for Justice
Levine's special concurrence. Justice Levine pointed to the case of
Myra Bradwell, who the United States Supreme Court ruled was rightly
excluded from the practice of law because of her sex.339 Justice Levine
commented that "[i]t may be that no reasonable jury in 1873 would
have found Bradwell's exclusion outrageous. But, surely, the same
cannot be said about juries in 1993."340
Justice Levine explained that, to prove intentional infliction of
emotional distress, it must be shown that the conduct is "to use the
vernacular, 'really gross.' It must substantially offend community
notions of acceptable conduct." 34 1 Justice Levine then went on to
demonstrate that sex discrimination should be "fairly regarded as
'atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community."' 342 She
observed that "[s]ex discrimination debases, devalues and despoils." 343
She further argued that:
Discrimination is not a tale of hurt feelings, unkind behavior or
inconsiderate conduct by one against another. That it may
insult is irrelevant; that it strips its victim of self-esteem, self-
confidence and self-realization is the nub of its evil and the
stuff of its outrageousness. 344
Justice Levine further observed that at least some reasonable jurors
in any given case surely believe that "sex discrimination, like race
discrimination, goes beyond all bounds of decency and is truly atrocious
and utterly intolerable in a civilized community." 345 The jury, there-
fore:
338. Id. at 186.
339. Id. at 187-88 n.l (Levine, J., concurring) (citing Bradwell v. Illinois, 16 U.S. (1 Wall.) 130
(1873)).
340. Id. at 188.
341. Id.
342. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d).
343. Id.
344. Id. (citations omitted).
345. Id.
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should be given the opportunity to consider the question and
plaintiff should be given the opportunity to educate, persuade
and convince the jury in this case, that the alleged sex discrimi-
nation has no place in our society and is outrageous, extreme
and wholly intolerable. The jury can take into account our
changing social mores, the development of civil-rights law, and
plaintiff's susceptibility as a member of a vulnerable class
which has been historically discriminated against, to decide
whether the conduct, that is, the sex discrimination, directed at
plaintiff, constitutes the outrageous conduct necessary for
plaintiff to prevail. 346
Returning to Myra Bradwell, Justice Levine observed that the
exclusion of women in Bradwell's time "rested on the belief that men,
simply because they were men, belonged in the public sphere rife with
power and status, and women, in the private sphere-the home." 347 She
wrote that such notions had changed over time, and that North Dakota's
first woman law school graduate, Helen Hamilton, received her degree in
1905.348 She concluded that, if Helen Hamilton today was denied a job
due to sex discrimination:
she would at least have the opportunity to right that' wrong by
having her day in court. She should be able to get to the jury
with evidence of sex discrimination, defendant's intent or
reckless disregard and her severe emotional distress and she
should be able to prevail if she establishes those three elements
of the tort by a preponderance of the evidence. To do that, she
will have to have successfully eliminated from the jury those
folks who just don't get it. It may well be that stereotypes
about the "proper place" of women and their need for special
treatment, like old soldiers, have not died. The jury can tell us
if they have faded away. 349
Chief Justice VandeWalle expressed his disagreement with the
positions of Justice Levine and the majority on sex discrimination and
intentional infliction of emotional distress in a separate opinion. 350 He
apparently was unimpressed by the fact that the majority opinion relative
to Swenson's claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress was
supported not only by allegations of gender bias, but by two additional




350. Id. (VandeWalle, CJ., concurring and dissenting).
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elements, Swenson's subordinate position and her deteriorating emotion-
al state. 351 Chief Justice VandeWalle argued that:
If Swenson's alleged facts constitute conduct'so outrageous in
character and so extreme in degree as to go beyond all possi-
ble bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious and
utterly intolerable in a civilized community, we will need to
devise a new tort to encompass conduct that comes within the
commonly accepted definition of those terms. 352
Chief Justice VandeWalle said that he did not want to be viewed as
condoning the conduct Swenson alleged, but that he did not believe the
conduct fit into the definition of intentional infliction of emotional
distress as a matter of law. 353 He observed that the opinions of Justice
Levine and the majority could be read to "hold that all conduct con-
stituting discrimination" amounts to the conduct required to show
intentional infliction of emotional distress. 354 He wrote he was "appre-
hensive" about such a holding as it could "make nearly every accusa-
tion of intentional infliction of emotional distress a jury question in the
hope that the jury, out of sympathy if nothing else, will agree with the
plaintiff that the defendant's conduct goes beyond all possible bounds
of decency." 355 Because of his misgivings about the positions taken by
Justice Levine and the majority opinion, Chief Justice VandeWalle con-
cluded he would have affirmed the trial court on the issue of intentional
infliction of emotional distress.3 56
It should be noted that Justice Meschke merely concurred in the
result of the Swenson majority opinion and that Justice Johnson, who was
a member of the court when Swenson was heard, but not when it was
decided, did not participate in the decision. The validity of the crucial
segment of the majority opinion, therefore, has been questioned by the
two justices, Justice Sandstrom and Justice Neumann, who succeeded
Chief Justice Erickstad and Justice Johnson on the court and who were
members of the court at the time Swenson was decided, but not when it
was heard. In a separate opinion to Security National Bank, Edgeley v.
Wald,357 Justice Sandstrom asserted that the North Dakota Constitution
allows a retired justice to sit as a surrogate justice only when a sitting
justice is disqualified or incapacitated. 358  He wrote: "None of the
351. See supra text accompanying note 337 (explaining factors considered by the majority).





357. 536 N.W.2d 924 (N.D. 1995).
358. Security Nat'l Bank, Edgeley v. Wald, 536 N.W.2d 924, 930 (N.D. 1995) (Sandstrom, J.,
concurring specially).
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specified grounds existed in Swenson. No justice filed a disqualification.
There was no assignment of the former Chief Justice to act for a justice
with a conflict of interest or for a justice physically or mentally in
capacitated." 359 Justice Sandstrom, therefore, alleged that Part III of the
majority opinion in Swenson was not supported by a majority because
Surrogate Judge Erickstad's participation was contrary to the state
constitution and apparently void.360 It may, therefore, be that the
"majority" opinion in Swenson will be of little precedential value.
The fate of the Swenson majority opinion, from the standpoint of
substantial precedent, should not and will not diminish the significance
of Justice Levine's special concurrence. Just like the dissenting opinions
of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes of years gone by (a judge Justice
Levine was fond of, and quoted in her own opinions), 361 Justice Levine's
special concurrence in Swenson may be the light that shows the way into
the future when there may be zero tolerance for discrimination on the
basis of gender. Only time will tell, and in the meantime, Justice
Levine's views will serve as a catalyst.
III. CONCLUSION
If you have read the introductory part of this article and skipped to
the end, you missed the material which generated and would explain the
vintage quotations from Justice Levine:
"[A]bsent a valid waiver of the right to counsel the resulting
conviction cannot . . . be used to enhance a term of imprisonment for a
subsequent offense." 362
"Domestic violence is not just one factor among many to be
considered. It is the only factor blessed by a presumption." 363
"[C]hildren are victimized by the climate of violence created by
domestic violence between their parents, even if they are not direct
targets of the abuse." 364
359. Id.
360. Id. We are unable to discern why Justice Sandstrom and Justice Neumann used the special
concurrence to Wald to assert their view that the Swenson majority was not a constitutional majority. It
could have been an attempt or desire on their part to clarify or purify the process for the future. Or, it
may have been a way of alerting all that they were reserving for the future their views on what may
constitute intentional infliction of emotional distress. We should not forget that Justice Mary Muehlen
Maring, Justice Levine's successor, will likely also have a significant influence in shaping the law in
this area.
361. See Northern X-Ray Co., Inc. v. State ex rel. Hanson. 542 N.W.2d 733, 735 (N.D. 1996)
("As Justice Holmes cautioned, [a] word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a
living thought and may vary greatly in color and content according to the circumstances and the time
in which it is used."').
362. State v. Orr, 375 N.W.2d 171, 178-79 (N.D. 1985).
363. Schestler v. Schestler, 486 N.W.2d 509,515 (N.D. 1992) (Levine, J. dissenting).
364. Heck v. Reed, 529 N.W.2d 155,163 (N.D. 1995).
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"[W]hen equally fit parents seek custody of children too young to
express a preference, and one parent has been the primary caretaker of
the children, custody should be awarded to the primary caretaker." 365
"Permanent support, often misunderstood or overlooked, is another
part of the arsenal available to restore economic equity to a partner of a
failed marital enterprise." 366
"It is .. . not a crime in this country to be a boor, absent resort to
fighting words."367
"Process, not product, is the key. When the process is riddled with
unfair, unseemly and unacceptable gender discrimination, it is of small
moment that the process did not entirely contaminate the product." 368
"[I]n cases of passive concealment by the seller of defective real
property, there is an exception to the rule of caveat emptor ... "369
"[N]egligence and strict liability overlap on the issue of duty to
warn."370
"It may well be that stereotypes about the 'proper place' of women
and their need for special treatment, like old soldiers, have not died. The
jury can tell us if they have faded away." 37 1
Because of the necessity to decide a case and move on, an appellate
court must find a consensus and regularly that is accomplished in a
single opinion that expresses the views of the entire court. In some cases,
one can voice an opinion in the lead opinion which is quite independent
of and different from the views of the justices who concur in the result,
but more often it is in the special concurrences and dissents that justices
are able to assert their individual views and positions which may have
more influence in the future than in the present. In that light, Justice
Levine's views have not only influenced the present, but will have a
significant influence in the future.
365. Gravning v. Gravning, 389 N.W.2d 621,624-25 (N.D. 1986) (Levine, J. dissenting).
366. Wiege v. Wiege, 518 N.W.2d 708, 713 (N.D. 1994) (Levine, J. concurring).
367. City of Bismarck v. Schoppert, 469 N.W.2d 808,811 (N.D. 1991).
368. City of Mandan v. Fern, 501 N.W.2d 739,748 (N.D. 1993).
369. Holcomb v. Zinke. 365 N.W.2d 507,512 (N.D. 1985).
370. Butz v. Werner, 438 N.W.2d 509, 521 (N.D. 1989) (Levine, J., dissenting).
371. Swenson v. Northern Crop Ins., Inc., 498 N.W.2d 174, 189 (N.D. 1993) (Levine, J.,
concurring specially).
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